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COMMENT.
THE REQUIREMENT OF A LICENSE TO PRACTICE OSTEOPATHY.
The law imposing qualifications upon those practicing the science
of medicine has gone through a gradual evolution from the time
when no qualification at all was necessary, when the charlatan and
quack were free to practice on the same footing as the skilled physi-
cian, to the present when the statutes require long courses of study
and difficult examinations. The courts, however, are not yet agreed
as to whether these qualifications apply to the osteopath. On thispoint we find a very marked conflict, a division which is largely due,
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of course, to the difference in the statutes of the respective States,
but noteworthy also for the difference of opinion as to whether
osteopathy is or is not a branch of medicine. That it is the practice
of medicine, and, therefore, subject to license requirements is held
in Illinois, Nebraska, Alabama and Ohio; that it is not is the
opinion of the courts of Mississippi, New York, Kentucky, Penn-
sylvania and North Carolina.
In Eastman v. People, 71 Ill. App. 236, under the broad definition
that "Medicine is the art of understanding diseases and curing or
relieving them when possible," it was held that the osteopath is
liable to the penalty imposed by the State for practicing .neda, "_-
without a license. This decision was followed in Little v. Stac
6o Neb. 749. In Bragg v. State, 134 Ala. 165, after reviewing th.--
authorities exhaustively, the court holds that a statute which makes
it unlawful for any person to practice "medicine or surgery without
having first obtained a certificate of qualification from one of the
authorized boards of medical examiners of this State," embraces
those who practice osteopathy, which as a science or art includ,:s
the diagnosis of disease and the treatment thereof by a system c.
manipulation of the limbs and body of the patient with the hands by
kneading, rubbing or pressing upon the different parts of the body.
"The practitioners (of medicine) are not simply those who prescribe
drugs or other medicinal substances as remedial agents, but are those
who diagnose disease and prescribe or apply any therapeutic agent
for its cure." In State v. Liffring, 61 Ohio St. 39, it was held that
osteopathy was not within the meaning of the act of Feb. 27, 1896,
but in State z Gravett, 65 Ohio St. 289, this finding was reversed
under a more recent statute.
In the recent case of Hayden %,. State, 33 South. 653, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi holds that a statute which provides that the
practice of medicine shall mean to "prescribe or direct for the use
of any person any drug, medicine, appliance or agency
for the cure" of any- disease, fracture, etc., does not apply to Qsteo-
pathy. The court construes the statute literally and says: "A
wise legislature some time in the future will doubtless make suitable
regulations for the practice of osteopathy so as to exclude the
ignorant and unskillful practitioners of the art among them." This
decision follows Smith v. Lane, 24 Hun 632, and Nelson v. State
Board, 57 S. W. 5Ol (Ken.), where it was held that the board of
health would be enjoined from interfering with or molesting one
in the practice of his profession as an osteopath. In Com. v. Pierce,
IO .Penn. Dist. 335, it was held that osteopathy was not within the
statute, but where a practitioner of osteopathy furnishes medicines
to patients or uses a sound, he is practicing medicine within its
meaning. The recent case of State v. MacKnight, 13r N. Car. 717,
decides the same way. The court says: "If it i. a fraud and im-
position, and injury results, the osteopath is liable both civilly and
criminally. Certainly baths and diet could be avantageously pre-
scribed to many people. Rubbing is well enough if the patient is
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not rubbed the wrong way. The real complaint is that osteopaths
restrict themselves to these remedies and do not resort to drugs
and surgery; but that very fact establishes that they do not violate
the law requiring a license to practice medicine and surgery. Doubt-
less there is an appeal to the imagination, but who does not know
that a prescription by a physician in whom the patient has implicit
confidence is oftentimes more effective than the same treatment by
one in whom he has none, and that at times bread pills and other
harmless prescriptions are administered with good results."
That such statutes do not prohibit the assumption of the title
"doctor" by any person; that praying for those suffering from dis-
ease, or teaching that disease will disappear and physical perfection
be attained as a result of prayer; and that the system known as
"Christian Science" do not come within their provisions has been
held in State of Rhode Island v. Mylod, 40 Atl. 753, 41 L. R. A.
428, and Evans v. State, 9 Ohio S. & C. Dec. 222.
The Legislature of Pennsylvania now has a bill under considera-
tion which provides that all persons who shall profess to diagniose
or treat disease or injury "by any method whatsoever" shall be
licensed, and that the condition of such license shall be the pa-bing
before a Board of Medical Examiners of a satisfactory examiiation
in anatomy, physiology, pathology, and diagnosis, or presen! sajis-
factory evidence of having passed such examination before a si.ailar
body in another State having equally stringent requirements. The
object of this bill, at least, would seem to offer a just solution of
the difficulty with which the legislatures and courts are now con-
fronted. On the one hand it would exclude from medical practice
by any system or method those not qualified by education to practice
intelligently. On the other hand by merely requiring a knowledge
of the elements of modern medical education it would not place too
great a check upon the liberty to choose one's own method of treat-
ment. The practitioner could practice any system subject only to
liability for malpractice.
RIGHT TO ENJOIN STRIKES ON THE GROUND OF INTERFERENCE WITH
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
The recent opinion of Judge Adams of the United States Circuit
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri in the case of the Wabash
R. R. Co. v. Hannahan (Mar. 31, 19o3). denying the right of the
plaintiff to enjoin the officers of the Brotherhoods of Railway
Engineers and Firemen from ordering a strike or otherwise inter-
fering with the fulfillment of their obligations to interstate com-
merce, has awakened much comment. The Central Law Journal
(Apr. I7, 1903) commenting on the decision reaches the conclusion
that the case of Re Debs, 158 U. S. 725 (1895), holds squarely
against the position taken by the court in the principal case. But
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it is submitted that Judge Adams ruled correctly on the facts of the
case in denying the injunction asked for.
The injunction in the Debs case was granted against the officers
of the American Railway Union to desist and refrain from hinder-
ing, obstructing, or stopping any of the business of certain railroads
as common carriers of passengers, freight or mails; and from com-
pelling or inducing by threats, persuasive force or violence any of
the employees to refuse or fail to perform any of their duties as
employees in any of the roads engaged in interstate commerce, and
from ordering, dirccting, aiding or abetting any person to commit
said acts. In that case it was clear that the union was directly
attempting to interfere with interstate commerce and to coerce
the railroads into granting their demands by means of such inter-
ference. While in the principal case it does not appear that any
direct interference with or molestation of interstate commerce was
intended, and the court expressly retained jurisdiction of the case
that all its lawful powers might be invoked to restrain such interfer-
ence or molestation if any resulted.
It certainly is not well settled how far employees or labor unions
can combine and by lawful means enforce legitimate demands upon
their employers, especially when the strike will result in molesting
interstate commerce. A strike may be lawful or unlawful as con-
trolled by the intent, or by the combination to injure, or the means
used to coerce employers to accede to the terms of the employees
or organization. Under the Interstate Commerce Act (St. L. I885-
87, p. 379) and the amendments thereto, providing that it shall be
unlawful for persons to combine or conspire together to hinder or
obstruct commerce, a combination or conspiracy of persons to hinder,
obstruct or interfere with the management of any such railroad
company, by threats, intimidation, force or violence against such
railroad companies or their employees in the discharge of their duties
will be enjoined. Waterhouse v. Comer, 55 Fed. 149; U. S. v.
Amalgamated Council, 54 Fed. 994; R. R. v. Rutherford, 62- Fed.
796;U. S. v. Elliott, 62 Fed. 8or; Toledo R. R. v. Penn. Co., 54 Fed.
730; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564. Where a combination or conspiracy
exists subjecting interstate commerce and the transportation of the
mails to the will of such conspirators equity has jurisdiction to
restrain such obstruction and prevent carrying into effect such con-
spiracy. In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564; U. S. v. Elliott, 62 Fed. Soi.
It will be observed that in these cases some malicious act or wilful
interference with interstate commerce seems to be necessary. The
intent existed to directly interfere with interstate commerce. A
distinction is to be drawn between the motive and the object and
he means employed. This distinction is a fine one perhaps, yet
i. a reasonable and a real distinction. So that if the object is a
lawful one equity cannot restrain carrying into effect such intention.
\ccordingly. wtiire the object is to obtain higher wages and to
withdraw from the service of the company if such wages are not
granted, no injunction should issue. Otherwise equity would be
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compelling the performance of personal services, and this cannot be
done by a mandatory injunction. Lumley v. Wagner, iDe. G. M.
& G. 604; Toledo R. R. v. Penn. Co., 54 Fed. 743. The fact that
employees of railroads may quit under circumstances that would
show bad faith on their part or a reckless disregard of their contract
or of the convenience and interests of both employer and public
does not justify a departure from the general rule that equity will
not compel employees against their will to remain in the personal
service of their employers. Arthurv. Oakes, (C. C. A.) 63 Fed. 310
(reversing Farmer's L. & Tr. Co. v. North Pac. R. R., 6o Fed. 803).
InArthur v. Oakes, supra, Mr. Justice Harlan says: "Their right
as a body of employees affected by the scale of wages to demand
given rates of compensation as a condition of their remaining in the
service was as absolutely perfect as was the rights of the receivers
representing those interested in the trust property. But that is a
very different matter from a combination or conspiracy among
emploves with the object and intent, not simply of quitting the
service of the receiver because of the scale of wages, but cripplilvg
the property in their hands and embarrassing the operation ot the,
railroads." Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. 310, 320. It is no crime for
any number of persons without an unlawful object in vie.," to asso-
ciate themselves together, and agree that they will not work for or
deal with certain men or classes of men, or ,\ork undr a certain
price or without certain conditions. Carcw z'. Rutherford, o6
Mass. 14; SnoW V. Wheeler, 113 Mass. 186; Yat. Prolctive A. s'n
v. Duff (N. Y. Court of Appeals, Apr. I, 1903). And it is held
by the Supreme Court in Hopkins v. U. S., 17" U. S. 578, in effect
that agreemeits among employees of a railroad company which are
condemned as in restraint of interstate commerce are such as have
some direct and innincdiate effect upon such commerce, and do not
include agreements not to work for less than a certain sum, or not
to work except under certain conditions, evcn though the cost of
interstate traffic would be thereby enhanced.
It is submitted that the test for determining whether a strike or a
threatened strike is lawful or unlawful is: (I) If the intent is to
interfere directly with interstate commerce, as by crippling the
operation of the railroad, the strike is unlawful; (2) If the object
is lawful, and there is no intent or means used either of force,
threats, violence or intimidation having a direct effect, the strike
is lawful.
LOTTERY TICKETS AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
In Champion v. Ames, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321, the United States
Supreme Court has decided (I) that lottery tickets are subjects of
traffic-and of interstate commerce; (2) that transportation of
same by common carriers among the States is interstate commerce;
(3) that Congress has absolute authority over such commerce (sub-
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ject to express constitutional limitations); and (4) that its power
to regulate interstate commerce includes the power to prohibit the
carriage of lottery tickets, and to destroy traffic of such character.
i. In the extended opinion written by Mr. Justice Harlan, the
development of the legal conception of "commerce" was traced
from Chief Justice Marshall's famous opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden,
which declared commerce to embrace all intercourse, including
navigation and passenger transit; through Brown v. Maryland, 12
Wheat. 419, which affirmed the doctrine of Congress's exclusive
power to regulate; through the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, de-
claring a State tax on alien, immigrants unconstitutional as infring-
ing on the jurisdiction of the national legislature; and through other
clarifying and defining decisions, Henderson v. Mayor, 92 U. S.
259; Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Un. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. i, etc.
In Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 69I, Field, J., said: "Commerce
with foreign countries and among the States, strictly considered,
consists in intercourse and traffic, including in those terms navi-
gation and the transportation and transit of persons and property,
as well as the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities." In
122 U. S. 347 (1Y. U. Tel. Co. v. Pendleton), the extension over
"not only the exchange and transportation of commodities, or visible,
tangible things, but the carriage of persons and the transmission by
telegraph of ideas, wishes, orders and intelligence" was announced,
and has subsequently repeatedly been reaffirmed. In Hanley v.
Kansas City Southern Ry., 187 U. S. (Feb. 1903), the ultimate pur-
pose of the goods or intelligence transmitted was declared immaterial
in the following language' "Transportation by others as an inde-
pendent business is commerce, irrespective of the purpose to sell
or retain the goods which the owner may entertain with regard to
them after they have been delivered." (As to private transportation
in the case of Francis '. L. S. decided at the same time as the
Champion case the court b\ a bare majority held that transportation
of lottery tickets across a State line by the owner's own vehicle
was not interstate commerce.) On the foundation of these "prior
adjudications the court in the case in review says: "They also
show that the power to regulate commerce among the several States
is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single govern-
ment having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise
of the power as are found in the constitution of the United States;
. . . that in determining the character of the regulations to
be adopted Congress has a large discretion which is not to be con-
trollt'd by the courts."
2. Considering the question whether lottery tickets were the
_,1bject of interstate traffic and therefore proper subjects of con-
gressional regulation or prohibition brought out the dissent of
Justices Fuller. Brewer. Peckham and Shiras. On the ground
that tle tickets represented so much money, payable contingently
tire person holding them, and could have been sold, the majority
u:;'ld the constitutionality of the act of 1895 forbidding transporta-
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tion of lottery tickets between States by agencies other than the
United States mails. That the purchaser could not have enforced
in the courts his claim for prize money drawn against the South
American lottery concern does not change the fact that some value
did attach to the tickets. The dissenting justices, however, speaking
by Chief Justice Fuller, say: "The lottery ticket purports to
create contractual relations and to furnish means of enforcing a
contractual right. This is true of insurance policies and both are.
contingent in their nature, yet this court has held that the issuing
of fire, marine, and life insurance policies in one State and sending
them to another, to be there delivered to the insured on payment
of premium, is not interstate commerce. Tested by the same reason-
ing, negotiable instruments are not instruments of commerce; bills
of lading are, because they stand for the articles included therein
hence it has been held that a State cannot tax interstate bills of
lading because that would be a regulation of interstate commerce,
and that Congress cannot tax foreign bills of lading because that
would be to tax the articles exported and in conflict with article
of Constitution of United States that 'no tax or duty shall be laid on
articles exported from any State.' Lottery tickets are forbidden to
be issued or dealt in by the laws of Texas the terminus a quo, and
by the laws of California or Utah, the terminus ad quem, were not
vendible, and for this reason also are not articles of commerce.
. . . To say that the mere carrying of an article which is not
an article of commerce in and of itself nevertheless becomes such
the moment it is to be transported from one State to another, is to
transform a non-commercial article into a commercial one simply
because it is transported. I cannot concede that any such result can
properly follow. It would be to say that everything is an article
of commerce the moment it is taken to be transported from place to
place and of interstate commerce if from State to State."
3. Passing the power of congress to legitimately regulate the.
carriage of lottery tickets as subjects of traffic and of commerce,
the question whether Congress may possess the power to prohibit
and destroy was presented. Quoting Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland that while the general government is one of enumerated
powers, the court say Congress has large discretion as to the means
that may be employed in executing a given power. "Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution are constitutional." Quoting Phalen v. Virginia
8 How. 163, as to duties of government to suppress nuisances in-
jurious to public health and morals, as to the peculiar perniciousness
of lotteries, and surveying the national police power, the court asks.
"If a State, when considering legislation for the suppression of lot-
teries within its own limits, may properly take into view the evils
that inhere in the raising of money, in that mode, why may not
congress, invested with the power to regulate commerce among the
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several States, provide that such commerce shall not be polluted by
the carrying of lottery tickets from one State to another?"
The efforts of States to protect themselves against the mischiefs
of undesirable businesses have in many instances been aided by the
national legislature, notably by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and
the Wilson Original Package Act-measures which unquestionably
destroyed much of the species of traffic aimed at. See U. S. v.
Freight Asso., 166 U. S. 290; U. S. v. Joint Traffic Asso., 171 U. S.
505, and Addison Pipe Co. v. U. S., 175 U. S. 211 (trust cases);
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. (sustaining prohibition of interstate
traffic in diseased cattle) ; It re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545; Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. Ioo, and Rhodes
v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412 (original package cases). As to a State's
release of its sovereign police power under constitutional provision,
see New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U. S. 265.
This case, Champion v. Ames, supra, has been argued three
times before the Supreme Court. The lotteries and express com-
panies were represented by some of the most distinguished lawyers
of the country-ex-Senator Edmunds, ex-Secretary Carlisle, Mr.
James C. Carter and Mr. William D. Guthrie of New York. Al-
though handed down by a divided court, it would seem that the
effect of the decision will be far-reaching not alone in further defin-
ing the scope of interstate commerce, but in extending the police
regulation of the central government at least to the extent of closer
co-operation with the States. The court, however, insists with
much particularity that its opinion is not to be taken as a decision
on the power of congress to arbitrarily exclude from interstate com-
merce any article, commodity or thing of whatever kind or nature;
and that the precise point passed on is merely that a thing so notori-
ously immoral, injurious and offensive to the whole people as lot-
teries may properly be suppressed by the police power of congress.
